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PP RUEHAG RUEHAST RUEHDA RUEHDBU RUEHDF RUEHFL RUEHIK RUEHKW RUEHLA
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DE RUEHMO #1677/01 1030322
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 130322Z APR 07
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9203
RUEHRC/USDA FAS WASHDC 4723
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA 0093
RUEHBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK 0777
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 4219
RUEHHI/AMEMBASSY HANOI 1510
RUEHPF/AMEMBASSY PHNOM PENH 0394
RUEHUM/AMEMBASSY ULAANBAATAR 0265
RUCPDO/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC
RUEHPH/CDC ATLANTA GA
RUEAUSA/DEPT OF HHS WASHDC
RHEFAFM/DIRAFMIC FT DETRICK MD//MA-1//
RHMFIUU/DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC//CT//
RHEFSNG/HMSNG WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 001677

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
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STATE FOR G/AIG
STATE ALSO FOR EUR/RUS, EB/TPP/ATP, EB/TPP/BTA, OES/STC
USDA FOR OSEC/DAN CAINE, FAS FOR OSTA/MACKE,
- WRIGHT, LEIER, ROSENBLUM; OCRA/THOMAS,
- FLEMINGS; OA/PATRICK CLERKIN
HHS FOR SAWYER, STEIGER
FAS PASS FSIS AND APHIS
SECDEF FOR OSD
VIENNA PASS APHIS/TANAKA, BRUSSELS PASS
- APHIS/FERNANDEZ
USDOC 3150/DAVID FULTON/MOLLY COSTA/ITA/CS/OIO/EUR
GENEVA PASS HEALTH ATTACHE
DEPARTMENT PASS USAID FOR GH/RCS/EE/ROSENBERG
CDC ATLANTA PASS SEPRL FOR DAVID SUAREZ

E.O. 12958: N/A

TAGS: [TBIO](#) [KFLU](#) [KSTH](#) [KPAO](#) [SENV](#) [RS](#)

SUBJECT: RUSSIAN OUTBREAK COMMUNICATION STRATEGIES IN COUNTRY AVIAN
INFLUENZA PLAN

REFS: A. STATE 46669

- [1](#)B. MOSCOW 1318
 - [1](#)C. 06 MOSCOW 8690
 - [1](#)D. MOSCOW 778
 - [1](#)E. MOSCOW 711
 - [1](#)F. MOSCOW 776
 - [1](#)G. MOSCOW 713
 - [1](#)H. MOSCOW 710
 - [1](#)I. MOSCOW 709
 - [1](#)J. 05 MOSCOW 13418

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[1](#)1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Per Ref A request, Russia has not yet adopted a communications strategy for avian and pandemic influenza that complies with WHO best practices for outbreak communication to the public. END SUMMARY.

[1](#)2. (SBU) Russia has yet to adopt a comprehensive Avian Influenza (AI) and Pandemic Preparedness Plan (Ref B) which links regional plans to an overall federal plan. The GOR also has not yet adopted a systematic outbreak communication strategy. Communications with the media and public do not at present comply with the WHO guidelines on best practices for outbreak communications in terms of

advanced planning and coordination. Ad hoc public outreach measures have included press coverage reporting on the AI situation, the migration patterns of wild birds, and Russia's success in producing a human vaccine. AI posters were distributed to health authorities and appear in some health centers. The Russian Red Cross in Siberia has trained its volunteers in AI prevention measures. It is seeking funding to expand this program. UNICEF is launching an information campaign to protect children in Dagestan.

13. (SBU) A draft AI national preparedness plan has been submitted to WHO for review, but needs further refinement and better linkage and coordination of oblast (regional) plans with a national plan (Ref B). The draft contains a brief section on communications with the public and media. That section notes the role of mass media in accurately informing the public about pandemics both country-wide and in affected regions. The media should also play a role in educating the public about clinical symptoms and individual protective measures to help avoid infection. Hotlines on treatment and prevention measures should be established in the event of a pandemic. The draft section also discusses in general terms the development of information outreach and education programs. An action plan adopted in 2006 (Ref C) did not mention the issue of communicating with the public and does not allocate any funding to such an effort.

14. (SBU) During some recent AI outbreaks among birds, government statements to the media sometimes appear to have been ad hoc and were not always coordinated among officials representing different federal ministries and agencies, and among regional officials (Refs D-I). In some cases, federal health officials have announced an AI outbreak before lab results confirmed the presence of AI (Ref I). Oblast officials and certain elected federal officials have periodically made irresponsible statements on the origin of

MOSCOW 00001677 002 OF 002

outbreaks and sought to link them to selfish actions by foreign governments (Ref J, among others).

15. (SBU) The public is generally informed within 24-48 hours after a suspected outbreak by government officials from the Ministries of Agriculture or Emergency Situations, or from the Federal Surveillance Service for Consumer Rights and Human Well-Being (Rospotrebnadzor), which is under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Health and Social Development. The Ministries of Agriculture and of Emergency Situations have also made recent statements to the public warning of the possibility of future AI outbreaks.

BURNS